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Abstract  
This paper lays the conceptual foundation for understanding the significant 
role that social media can and does play in relation to spreading the threat and growth 
of terrorism, especially ‘home-grown’ terrorism.  The utility of social media 
applications (eg. Facebook, Twitter, You Tube) to recruit, communicate and train 
terrorists is explored through the perspective of Knowledge-Managed Policing 
(KMP). The paper concludes with the implications this conceptual analysis of   
terrorism as a new dot.com presence on the internet has for law enforcement and the 
global cyber community.   
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Introduction 
The advent of social media (eg. Facebook, Twitter, You Tube) has created 
new opportunities for terrorist organisations and brought with it growing challenges 
for law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Whilst the use of online resources by 
terrorist organisations is not a new occurrence, what is new is the shift to a broader 
focus by national intelligence agencies towards the increasing threat of ‘home-grown’ 
terrorism (ABC News, 2005, 2011; Johnson, 2010; Silber and Bhatt 2007; Wright 
2006).  A review of extant literature shows a dearth of research into the connection 
between theoretical and practical applications of social media by terrorist groups and 
the strategies available to counteract such use.  
This study seeks to address aspects of this conceptual gap in the literature by 
outlining a framework based on a Knowledge-Managed Policing (KMP) approach to 
the analysis of social media use by terrorists.  Three of the most popular social media 
applications - Facebook, Twitter and YouTube – are focused on in this study as 
examples of how ’online terrorism’ has become a new dot.com with the potential to 
harness the power of social media for recruiting, communicating, training and funding 
‘home-grown’ terrorists. 
 
Social Media’s Utility for Terrorism  
The introduction of Web 2.0 applications—websites based solely on 
interactive user-generated content, or ‘social media’, as opposed to more traditional 
static websites where users can only view content (Tech Pluto, 2009; Vorvoreanu and 
Kisselburgh, 2010) over the last 10 years has created new opportunities for online 
engagement. These social media sites effectively create online communities based 
upon users generating, collaborating on, viewing, and sharing content (Tech Pluto, 
2009; Vorvoreanu and Kisselburgh, 2010). Wikipedia, as an example, is a free online 
encyclopaedia that only contains articles generated, edited and reviewed by its user 
base (Wikipedia, 2011). 
The uptake of social media websites by the general public increased rapidly 
with the emergence of websites such as MySpace and Facebook, which allowed 
people to ‘connect’ online with their friends and family, and encouraged the creation 
of online communities based on common interests, political ideologies or 
geographical locations (Wooley et al., 2010). As the statistics began to appear 5 
 
 
 
showing the incredible surge in popularity of social media websites, people from all 
political persuasions quickly realised the value of this new resource (Wooley et al., 
2010). 
Social media quickly presented itself as a cheap and effective tool for mass-
communication, as well as an effective method of specifically targeting key 
demographics (Earl and Kimport, 2011; Papic and Noonan, 2011; Wooley, et al., 
2010).  As far back as the 1990’s political groups and leaders have used the Internet 
for political purposes (Earl and Kimport, 2011; Wooley et al., 2010). However, this 
was largely limited to the use of dedicated websites and e-mailing lists to distribute 
their campaign messages to constituents (Earl and Kimport, 2011).   
With the advent of Web 2.0 technology the use of static forms of social media 
for political use were transformed into more dynamic and ever-evolving phenomena.  
For instance, in 2008 the value of social media was evidenced during the US 
Elections with the then presidential candidate, Barack Obama, investing a significant 
amount of time developing a Facebook page, Twitter account and YouTube channel 
(Wooley et al., 2010). However, it soon became apparent that social media could be 
used for other political purposes, from simply providing a forum for like-minded 
political dissidents to voice their opinions, to being used for organising and instigating 
major political riots and even revolutions (Earl and Kimport, 2011; Papic and 
Noonan, 2011). 
Three of the most popular social media sites are Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube (Alexa, 2011b). Whilst these applications use different technologies, one 
important similarity between them is that any person with a valid email address and 
who claims to be over 13 years old can register as a user on the site (Facebook, 2011; 
Parental Guide, n.d; Twitter, 2011; YouTube, 2011)—affording a measure of 
anonymity to users if they require it. Furthermore, it is notable that recently the most 
popular social media sites have seen an increase in integration, so that content posted 
on one social media site will simultaneously appear on all other connected sites 
(Angelos, 2007; Gannes, 2009; Kelsey, 2010; O’Neill, 2009; Swisher, 2008). 
 
Facebook – Virtual Recruitment Strategy  
Facebook falls into the ‘social networking’ category of social media; its 
primary function is to build and maintain relationships between people (Alexa, 2011a; 6 
 
 
 
Wooley et al., 2010). Users of Facebook create an online profile using their personal 
details, add connections to friends or family (or strangers, if desired), and can then 
post ‘status updates’ on their page or write messages to other users. Members can also 
create and join ‘groups’ based on similar interests such as support for a particular 
political group or cause (Wooley et al., 2010). 
In addition to the inherent advantage of being the most widely used social 
media site throughout the world, the ‘groups’ application within Facebook presents 
itself as an invaluable tool for terrorist groups to organise themselves online, and 
attract other like-minded people to their cause (Wooley et al., 2010). Groups are 
public by default, and members of the group can send out invitations to friends to 
recommend that they also join. In this fashion groups can very quickly increase in 
size, especially when a political purpose is involved (Wooley et al., 2010). Once a 
group has its user base, any member can send out notifications or messages to every 
user who has joined the group instantaneously and free of charge (Wooley et al., 
2010).  
Facebook provides what is essentially an ‘all-in-one’ service to any group who 
knows how to use it. While Facebook is certainly capable of acting as a 
communication service similar to Twitter, and is capable of hosting videos similar to 
YouTube, the primary function of Facebook for terrorist organisations is for 
recruitment purposes (Department of Homeland Security, 2010; Torok, 2010). 
Traditionally, the online presence of a terrorist organisation consisted primarily of a 
website and possibly a private forum to facilitate jihadist discussions. The problem 
with this model, as pointed out by a forum poster on a jihadist website, was that an 
‘elitist community’ was created, with those people on the outside having difficulty 
accessing the community (Department of Homeland Security, 2010). Facebook allows 
terrorist organisations to avoid this issue. 
The most important and useful Facebook feature for terrorist organisations is 
the ‘groups’ function (Torok, 2010). The apparent strategy used by terrorist 
organisations is to create a Facebook group based on a seemingly innocent ideal, such 
as supporting Palestinians or Islam in general (Department of Homeland Security, 
2010; Torok, 2010). As member numbers for the groups increase, jihadist material 
can be slowly introduced by members of the organisation to the Facebook group in a 
way which does not directly condone or encourage jihadist actions, and thus does not 7 
 
 
 
constitute a violation of Facebook policy (Department of Homeland Security, 2010; 
Torok, 2010). From this position, the group can even be directed straight to the 
website and forums of the terrorist organisation behind the Facebook group. 
The threat posed by online recruitment is significant (Stein, 2011; al-Shishani, 
2010; Weimann, 2010). There are no borders to be crossed, and no effective methods 
for intervention (Department of Homeland Security, 2010; Torok, 2010). Facebook 
allows terrorist organisations to recruit people from all around the world, without 
posing any significant threat to the security of the organisation (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2010; Torok, 2010). Importantly, once people become members 
of the group, the organisation can then seamlessly transition into the next phase: 
training. 
 
Twitter –Instant Communication Strategy  
Twitter falls into the ‘blogging’ category of social media; however it is more 
aptly described as a ‘micro-blogging’ service (Van der Zee, 2009). Registered users of 
the site post publicly visible messages on their profile called ‘tweets’: text-based 
messages of up to 140 characters (Van der Zee, 2009). Users can subscribe to other 
users to automatically receive their posts, and can follow specific topics by using 
‘hashtags’ (#), which are used to flag posts as belonging to a certain group or topic 
(Van der Zee, 2009), for example #terrorism to follow tweets related to the topic of 
‘terrorism’.  
The ability to instantaneously send small bits of information to a virtually 
unlimited number of people free of charge makes Twitter an extremely valuable tool 
for political purposes (Papic and Noonan, 2011; Van der Zee,2009). Twitter hashtag 
groups can function in a similar way to Facebook groups, except without a designated 
leader, with users often ‘retweeting’ (re-posting) to ensure the message is spread (Van 
der Zee, 2009). This is in part where the real value of Twitter lies: in the constantly 
changing virtual communities that are created almost naturally during major events 
(Papic and Noonan, 2011; Van der Zee, 2009). Political movements and protests in 
particular see these online communities thrive, where large amounts of people both 
directly and indirectly involved in an incident begin flocking to follow the relative 
hashtag for the event (Papic and Noonan, 2011; Van der Zee, 2009).  8 
 
 
 
The threat posed by Twitter arises from both its ability to send out instant 
messages to large numbers of people, and from the ability for people to follow 
particular topics as well as groups (O’Rourke, 2010). Terrorist organisations can 
utilise Twitter at an operation level, using the service to keep up-to-date on any new 
information that emerges in the public sphere (Weimann, 2010; O’Rourke, 2010; US 
304
th Military Intelligence battalion, 2008). The 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai 
present an apt example of how terrorist organisations can utilise social media sites 
such as Twitter. 
The 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks occurred on 26 November, with more than 
10 sites throughout Mumbai targeted by an Islamic terrorist organisation from 
Pakistan: Lashkar-e-Taiba (O’Rourke, 2010). The attacks killed 164 people and 
injured over 300. One of the most important issues that arose from the attacks was the 
technological sophistication of the attackers. All of the attackers were equipped with 
BlackBerry smart-phones, and not only utilised VOIP (Voice over Internet Protocol), 
but also carried multiple SIM cards to switch into the phones if authorities were able 
to block them (O’Rourke, 2010; US 304
th Military Intelligence battalion, 2008). 
Post-attack interviews with the sole surviving attacker, combined with 
information from intercepted phone calls from the attackers during the events 
indicated that the terrorists were in constant contact with controllers based in Pakistan 
(O’Rourke, 2010; Rabasa et al., 2009). The controllers were able to keep track of the 
constant up-to-date flow of information streaming from public Twitter posts and 
communicate it directly to the attackers (Leggio, 2008; O’Rourke, 2010; Rabasa et al., 
2009). This included critical information such as the movements and positioning of 
the Indian counter-terrorism units planning the assault on the hotel (Lee, 2008; 
Leggio, 2008; O’Rourke, 2010). 
Examples such as Mumbai serve to demonstrate the increasingly advanced 
technological sophistication of terrorist organisations. In order to effectively combat 
these groups, robust counter-strategies for social media must be developed and 
implemented by government agencies as soon as possible. 
 
YouTube – Cyber Training Strategy 
YouTube falls into the ‘video sharing’ category of social media; the primary 
function of the website is to host videos uploaded by users, which are then publicly 9 
 
 
 
viewed and shared around the world (Vergani and Zuev, 2011). Registered users of 
YouTube are able to upload videos in a wide range of formats up to 15 minutes in 
length, and in most cases viewers do not need to register (Vergani and Zuev, 2011). 
Registered members can subscribe to another user’s YouTube ‘channel’, receiving 
alerts whenever a new video is posted on that channel (Vergani and Zuev, 2011). 
While there are a range of restrictions over what cannot be uploaded, the ‘post-hoc’ 
review system used for YouTube videos means that only those videos which have 
been ‘reported’ by viewers will be reviewed and potentially removed by YouTube 
staff, thus making abuse of the system possible by terrorist groups. 
YouTube is free, easy to use, difficult for state authorities to control, and can 
be used to communicate with a tightly-knit group to the entire world (Vergani and 
Zuev, 2011). Furthermore, YouTube can provide a more effective means of 
communication than text-based social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter, 
simply due to the ability to use sound and video (Vergani and Zuev, 2011).  
Like Facebook, YouTube has multiple uses for terrorist organisations 
(Weimann, 2010; Bergin et al, 2009; George, 2009). Video can be a much more 
effective means of communicating an issue than plain text, so for this reason alone 
YouTube would be an invaluable tool for terrorist organisations (Torok, 2010). For 
example, Anwar Al Awlaki is a prominent and ‘highly dangerous’ planner and trainer 
for ‘Al Qaeda and all of its franchises’, well known for his utilisation of social media 
sites such as Facebook and YouTube to spread his extremist messages (Madhani, 
2010; Shephard, 2009; Smith, 2009). As of 2010, Awlaki was known to have posted 
over 5000 videos on YouTube (Torok, 2010). However, more important than simply 
relaying a message or calling for people to take action is showing them physically 
how to do it; this is where YouTube’s value for terrorist organisations is truly shown 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2010). 
Videos explaining and visually demonstrating practices such as tactical 
shooting or the field stripping of an AK47 have been identified as examples of 
training that is effectively communicated over YouTube (Department of Homeland 
Security, 2010). Additionally, these types of training videos do not actively incite 
violence, and thus do not contravene YouTube’s policy, and will therefore not be 
deleted (Department of Homeland Security, 2010). Terrorist organisations can also 
take advantage of YouTube’s ‘post-hoc’ review system by uploading bomb making 10 
 
 
 
instructions and other such videos that violate YouTube policy, but which can 
potentially be viewed hundreds of times before the videos are reported and deleted. 
 
Terrorism: A New Dot.Com  
According to Awan (2010) the internet has surpassed all other media forms in 
becoming the principle arena for terrorist media activity, and the primary platform for 
the dissemination of jihadism. Furthermore, this review has demonstrated it is not 
only political activists who see the competitive advantage of using social media, as   
the three most popular social media sites (Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube) have 
value-added to terrorism’s ability to communicate, organise, recruit, and train would 
be terrorists (Alexa, 2011b; Weimann, 2006; Wright, 2006).  Furthermore, terrorist 
groups are also using social media for fundraising purposes (Strohm, 2011; Gray, 
2009; Caldwell, 2008; Conway, 2006).   
This cluster of issues is of particular relevance to countries like Pakistan with 
large Muslim populations where fertile minds exist for social media to radicalism free 
of charge.  Moreover, countries such as Australia face their own concerns about social 
media, where the traditional transnational terrorism threat is being replaced by a much 
more pervasive and difficult to detect ‘home-grown’ or ‘grass-roots’ terrorism threat 
embedded in virtual realities (Johnson, 2010; ABC News, 2005, 2011; Silber and 
Bhatt, 2007; Wright, 2006).  
This review found that whilst the quality of the literature that focused on 
terrorists’ use of social media was generally of a higher quality than that related to 
political activism in general, the number of articles available on this issue was limited 
(Bjelopera and Randol, 2010; Hoffman, 2010; Silber and Bhatt, 2007; Weimann, 
2006). Furthermore, many of the articles had been written by, or for, the US military 
(Mayfield, 2011; McCullar, 2010; Petraeus, 2010; US Joint Forces Command – Joint 
Warfighting Center, 2010). While the majority of content in these articles was highly 
relevant, the recommendations presented for strategies to deal with the issues were 
focused on military applications, as opposed to more generally applicable strategies or 
those which were specific to government or intelligence agencies.  
Those articles which did not focus on military applications debated the 
effectiveness of the three broad policy approaches that governments can adopt: zero 
tolerance, encouraging extremist narrative to be challenged through the same social 11 
 
 
 
media tools that promote it, and intelligence gathering (Bergin et al, 2009; Caldwell, 
2008). 
Hence, what is also clear from this review is that governments, law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies are adapting to this new political and social 
environment created by Web 2.0
1 inspired social media and are seeking to find and 
adopt new policies and strategies to minimize these threats and harness the presented 
opportunities.   For instance, in June 2011, the Joint Select Committee on Cyber-
Safety instituted by the Australian Parliament tabled its report on its Inquiry into 
Cyber-Safety entitled High-Wire Act: Cyber-Safety and the Young. 
Moreover, there was a rapid expansion and widespread growth of ‘Jihadist’ 
websites during the period when Web 2.0 technologies
2 began widely available 
around 2004 onwards.  For instance, research by Weimann (2006) into the use of the 
Internet by terrorist groups showed that between 1997 and 2006, the number of 
websites dedicated to terrorist groups rose from only about 12, to over 7000. 
Similarly, Stein (2011:3) cites a U.S. State Department report in 1998, that 
“… there were only 15 Web Sites run by groups defined by US as "terrorist" groups. 
In 2005, this number increased to more than 4000.”  
While the terrorist organisations that are advanced enough to have a presence 
online would traditionally stick to the use of ‘jihadist websites’ and forums, where 
most of the users were people already supporting the cause (Department of Homeland 
Security, 2010), the transition into the more ‘open’ realm of social media has given 
them the opportunity to reach significantly larger audiences than was previously 
possible.  For instance, Cohen (2009) found that terrorist groups actively target the 
large number of social media users among vulnerable populations in impoverished 
regions in the Middle East, Africa and Asia, and poorly integrated immigrant 
communities in Western Europe. 
Therefore, the conceptual picture which emerges from this review is that Web 
2.0 social media technologies have allowed terrorism to become a massive ‘dot.com’ 
                                                 
1 The term Web 2.0 is “associated with web applications that facilitate participatory 
information sharing, interoperability, user-centered design, and collaboration on the World Wide Web” 
(Wikipedia, accessed on 5.10.2011)   
2 Although the term ‘Web 2.0’ was coined in January 1999 by Darcy DiNucci, a information 
architecture consultant in her article ‘Fragmented Future’ it’s real rise in popularity took hold from 
2003 onwards after the first Web 2.0 Conference was hosted by Tim O’Reilly Media and MediaLive 
(Wikipedia, accessed on 5.10.2011).        12 
 
 
 
presence on the internet.   Figure 1 below illustrates the virtual pathways utilised by 
terrorism to carry out its core functions ‘online’.    
 
 
< insert Figure 1 here >  
 
 
 
As can be seen from Figure 1, the conceptual mapping above depicts the 
phenomenal rise of Jihadist expansion on the web through both closed and open 
access portals as well as the various configurations of online terrorism. As such, it 
provides a useful starting point for research but much more work needs to be done 
before a clearer picture of radicalism and its effectiveness comes into focus.    
This is in part due to the very limited amount of scholarly empirical research 
in the existing literature on the effectiveness of social media by terrorist organisations 
to radicalise people (Leuprecht and Skillicorn, 2011).  Much is anecdotal and based 
on biased samples.  For instance, al-Shishani (2010) reports that “… according to 
Pakistani authorities, the five young American Muslims arrested in Pakistan last 
December were recruited online via You Tube and Facebook after the suspects used 
these sites to reach out to groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Lashkar-e-Jhangyi 
(Dawn [Karachi], December 16)”.  In addition, there are major issues with the range 
of quality found in the literature, as well as with the lack of connections made 
between theory and practical application.  
Given such limitations the role of Knowledge Management (KM) in capturing 
relevant and reliable data, information, intelligence and evidence on which to base 
policing and law enforcement of social media is still in its infancy.   However, KM 
does have substantial applicability for policing online terrorism.  For instance, the 
notion of ‘Knowledge-Managed Policing’ (KMP) coined by Dean is a foundational 
framework for managing, systematically, the application of knowledge to enhance 
policing effectiveness through harnessing practitioner-based knowledge and 
integrating such tacit knowledge with KM processes and appropriate IT support 
systems (Dean and Gottschalk, 2007).  Furthermore, the utility of KMP for managing 
the challenges associated social media must, of necessity, involved a range of 
Communication Interception Technologies (CIT) by police and other law enforcement 
agencies.  Dean, Bell, and Congram (2010) have previously outlined the significance 13 
 
 
 
of KMP as an organising framework for using CIT as an investigative tool for 
knowledge creation, capture, storage, retrieval, transfer, sharing, application and 
integration.   Moreover, Dean (2007) developed a multi-context model of the 
terrorism process which is the subject of future work to integrate KMP with this 
terrorism model in order to expand available counter-terrorism options to police and 
law enforcement agencies, especially in relation to this dark side of social media.      
 A special report on Countering internet radicalisation in Southeast Asia in 
2009 by Bergin, Osman, Ungerer, and Yasin identified three broad policy approaches 
and/or a combination of them which governments tend to adopt towards dealing with 
online terrorism. There are as stated in the report (2009:12): 
• a hard strategy of zero tolerance (blocking sites, prosecuting site 
administrators, using internet filters) 
• a softer strategy of encouraging internet end users to directly challenge the 
extremist narrative (including creating websites to promote tolerance) 
• an intelligence-led strategy of monitoring leading to targeting, investigation, 
disruption and arrest. 
 
Essentially, these policy approaches translate into a policing/law enforcement 
counter-terrorism continuum ranging from prevention to utilisation methodologies. 
Prevention Methodologies would include aspects of a ‘zero tolerance strategy’ 
whereby sites are censored, blocked or cut off and aspects of an ‘intelligence-led 
strategy’ of monitoring, targeting, investigating, disrupting and ultimately arresting 
and prosecuting those involved in terrorist activities. For instance:  
  censoring sites, eg. South Korea deletes political content from various 
social media sites regarded as North Korean propaganda (Eun-jung, 
2011)   
  blocking sites, eg. ‘The Great Firewall of China’ where access to 
websites deemed to be politically sensitive or offensive are blocked 
(Petraeus, 2010).   
  cutting off complete access to the internet for entire regions or 
countries, eg. during the 2011 revolution in Egypt (Papic and Noonan, 
2011)   
  Proactive Intelligence monitoring and collection eg. developing risk 
profiles of potential terrorists through monitoring terrorist-related 
social media sites, (Norris, 2011)         14 
 
 
 
 
Utilisation Methodologies would include some aspects of an ‘intelligence-led 
strategy’, mainly that of disinformation, and a softer strategy of encouraging and 
challenging extremist narratives.  For instance: 
  Disinformation via ‘sock puppets’
3, eg. Sock puppets have been used 
to infiltrate online-based political or terrorist groups, and once inside to 
spread disinformation about the location and activities of law 
enforcement to disrupt the plans of the group and/or direct their protest 
towards a location that can be easily controlled (Norris, 2011; Papic 
and Noonan, 2011)   
  ‘Insider Knowledge’ intelligence gathering, eg. tips offs by informers 
and human assets inside terrorist’s cells and sites in order to utilise  
such knowledge strategically (Norris, 2011)           
  Creating alternative websites by moderate Muslim groups, eg. 
harnessing soical media to promote peace and democracy (Caldwell, 
2008); providing alternatives to extremist influence (Cohen, 2009)      
All counter-terrorism policy approaches and law enforcement strategic 
methodologies are depend on and require a substantive investment in a range of 
resources to counter social media-based radicalisation.  The Special report by Bergin 
et al (2009:13) outlines in broad terms the technical, human and intellectual resources 
necessary to deal with online terrorism as follows: 
  Technical infrastructure 
The technical requirements are secure, unattributable, superfast (broadband 
 and wireless) ICT systems, and the ability to access and view extremist sites  
(visibility of the environment is fundamental). 
  Human resources 
People with analytical, linguistic and technical skills are essential. They will 
 need adequate training and the support of experts. 
  Knowledge and intellectual capital 
It’s necessary to stay abreast of the latest trends and industry developments,  
and governments aren’t normally at the forefront of internet-related trends. 
  
 
                                                 
3 A ‘sock puppet’ is a fake online profile created with sufficient background information to 
appear to others as a real person (Fielding and Cobain 2011; Merriam Webster 2011; Stone and 
Richtel, 2007). Sock puppets can be operated remotely, providing protection for the operator, and also 
present a unique opportunity in that one operator can manage multiple sock puppets simultaneously. 15 
 
 
 
This massive investment is ultimately about Knowledge Management and the 
mobilisation of relevant resources.  Since 9/11 and the extraordinary growth of online 
terrorism, the academic community is also playing a significant role with the 
emergence of  a new interdisciplinary field of study and research known as ‘Terrorism 
informatics’ (Chen, Reid, Sinai, Silke, and Ganor, 2008).   
According to Chen (2011:1) “Terrorism informatics has been defined as the 
application of advanced methodologies, information fusion and analysis techniques to 
acquire, integrate process, analyze, and manage the diversity of terrorism-related 
information for international and homeland security-related applications.”   
Chen notes the wide variety of methods used in ‘terrorism informatics’ to 
collect massive amounts of many and varied types of multi-lingual information from 
multiple sources.   Hence, ‘terrorism informatics’ draws on a diversity of disciplines 
from Computer Science, Informatics, Statistics, Mathematics, Linguistics, Social 
Sciences, and Public Policy and their related sub-disciplines to achieve “ Information 
fusion and information technology analysis techniques, which include data mining, 
data integration, language translation technologies, and image and video processing, 
play central roles in the prevention, detection, and remediation of terrorism.” (op. cit).   
 
 
 
Conclusion  
This review of the extant literature from military, academic and public open 
sources presents a disturbing picture of the multiple pathways Web 2.0 ‘social media’ 
technologies provide for terrorists and militant extremists to utilise and develop cyber 
terrorism into a potent virtual battleground which police and security agencies must 
confront on a very uneven global playing field.     
Furthermore, it is evident from this review that the concept and practice of 
‘Knowledge-Managed Policing’ (KMP) is highly relevant, timely and necessary 
perspective for policing/law enforcement/security agencies.  Adopting a salient 
Knowledge Management approach can tip the competitive advantage towards 
policing the multitude of harms and threats that ‘online terrorism’ presents through 
the medium of the dark side of social media for Civil Society.       
       16 
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Figure 1: Conceptual Pathways of Online Terrorism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 